Building the next model for intervention and turnaround in poorly performing local authorities in England by Murphy, P & Jones, M
1 
 
MURPHY, P. and JONES, M., 2016. Building the next model for intervention and 
turnaround in poorly performing local authorities in England. Local 




This paper examines the design and implementation of the two recent models or 
strategies adopted for the intervention and turnaround of poorly performing local 
authorities in England in the two distinct periods of 2002-2008 and 2011-2015. The 
first was integral to the Comprehensive Performance Management regimes, while 
the second was developed under the Sector Led Improvement regime. The intention 
is not to determine which regime has, or had, the most merit or inadequacies, but 
rather to synthesize knowledge and identify areas that could be improved as policy 
and practice moves forward, particularly in the light of the recent general election in 
the UK. The paper finds that both models have merits as well as weaknesses, 
dependent upon context and policy priorities. It provides a review of when and where 
alternative models should be used, and a contribution to the development of the next 
regime. This, the authors contend, should have a greater emphasis on achieving 
more appropriate levels of public assurance than the current model is providing. 
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The external inspection and subsequent intervention in public services by agencies 
of central government in the UK dates back at least to the inspection of schools 
under the factories Act of 1833 (Martin 2008) and the establishment of Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary in 1856 (Murphy 2014). It has of course become an 
enduring world-wide phenomenon (Beeri 2013a, Beeri 2012b, Rutherford 2014). The 
response to adverse inspection or audit reports has also been a mixture of internal 
and external actions, advice, and assistance, often to be followed by re-inspection. 
Together with the increasing demand for economic, efficient and effective public 
services over the last 30 years, has naturally come the desire for economic, efficient 
and effective action to address substantially underperforming public services or 
public organisations.  
 
Post 2008 recession austerity measures introduced by central government in the UK 
have meant that local public service delivery bodies are experiencing an 
unprecedented period of change and uncertainty, although these circumstances are 
not confined to the UK. As the Coalition Government increasingly adopted, applied 
and prolonged the theory and practice of cutback management between 2010 and 
2015, local bodies have had to respond to the demands of reduced financial 
resources, while faced with an ageing population and rising expectations of public 
services. These have been accompanied by the introduction of alternative delivery 
models and hybrid models of governance such as those occasioned by, the 
introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, the continuing devolution of powers 
to Scotland and Wales, the restructuring of Health and Social Care under the 2012 
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Act, and the creation of new Combined Authorities in Local Government.  This 
comes at a time when, in the name of ‘austerity localism’ (Lowndes and Pratchett 
2012), centralised performance measurement, management and monitoring within 
the local government sector, has largely been reduced to individual service-based 
inspection regimes. The pre-2010 performance management regime co-ordinated by 
the former Audit Commission has been  replaced by voluntary, peer review and 
sector-led  mechanisms which potentially reduce public assurance, and increase the 
risk that organisational failure will re-emerge within the sector in the future (Murphy 
et al 2012, 2014, Murphy and Greenhalgh 2013, 2014). Although the formal closure 
of the Audit Commission was finally completed by the end of March 2015, following 
the enactment of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, its responsibilities had 
already been emasculated, and its resources significantly reduced, by the time the 
CLG Select Committee report reported on its demise in 2011 (House of Commons 
2011). 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the intervention and turnaround regimes 
that operated in local authorities in England between 2002 and 2008, under the 
former Comprehensive Performance Assessment regime (CPA),  with the current 
‘sector-led intervention model’ (SLI) which has effectively operated since 2011 (LGA 
2011); and for which a series of recent evaluations have been published, most 
notably from the main proponents and developers of the model, the Local 
Government Association (LGA), (Bennett et al 2014, Downe et al 2014a, Downe et al 
2014b, LGA 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014, Planning Advisory Service 2013, Shared 
Intelligence 2013, 2014). The intention is to synthesize knowledge of the field 
highlight areas for further research or investigation and inform policy and practice in 
this area.  
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The intervening period between 2008 and 2011 was, to an extent, a transition period 
within which major restrictions on the financial resources of local authorities were 
introduced by the new Coalition Government, and, amongst a number of other public 
bodies, it was announced that the Audit Commission was to be abolished (DCLG 
2010a). The closure of the Audit Commission followed one of the longest select 
committee investigations and reports of the Coalition Government’s tenure. This 
focused on audit and inspection in local public services, which was directly linked to 
the announcement of the abolition of the Commission by the Secretary of State 
(House of Commons 2011).  
The LGA, who are the representative body that collectively advocates on behalf of 
local authorities in England were the main proponents of sector led performance 
management and support both before, and after, the CPA framework was introduced 
in 2002. CPA was led by central government, and co-ordinated by the former Audit 
Commission (Campbell-Smith 2008) who published their final evaluation of the CPA 
regime in 2008 (Audit Commission 2008).  
CPA utilised external inspectorates, external peers and ‘change agents’ and was 
often characterised as being a ‘top down and centralised’ performance management 
regime. CPA was however a unique era in the performance management of English 
local government, corresponding as it did, with the introduction of a national and 
comprehensive system of performance indicators and comparable standards and 
measures across all local authorities. CPA, allowed a comparison of corporate and 
service performance to be undertaken across the whole local authority sector for the 
first time (Audit Commission 2001, 2005).   
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Following the 2015 general election, and building on earlier reports from the National 
Audit Office (NAO) (2013a, 2013b), there have been increasing calls for reform and 
change in the governance, accountability, public assurance and management of 
local public services (Timmins and Gash 2014, CIPFA 2015, Brown, 2015, Murphy & 
Greenhalgh, 2015, Ferry and Murphy, 2015). 
This paper focuses on one aspect of the performance management regime, namely 
the intervention and turnaround arrangements for addressing significantly under-
performing local public services. More specifically, it concentrates on the corporate, 
or organisation-wide, intervention arrangements for local authorities, which are 
generally considered to be the most politically sensitive interventions and 
undoubtedly had the most significant impacts on public policy, service design and 
delivery since they were introduced in 2001. It is also an area of increasing 
international academic interest (Beeri 2012, 2013b). 
The paper will therefore very briefly examine the literature of strategic turnaround 
and intervention before contextualising, and strategically positioning, the role of 
corporate intervention. The two regimes will then be investigated to compare and 
contrast their strengths with a view to informing policy and practice in the future. This 
need to look to the future, and a desire for continuous improvement, is also a stated 
concern for the LGA, which recently produced a consultation on the SLI regime (LGA 
2015), following the publication of the reports mentioned above (Bennett et al 2014, 
Downe et al 2014a, Downe et al 2014b, LGA 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014, Planning 
Advisory Service 2013, Shared Intelligence 2013, 2014).   
The more specific focus of this paper is greatly informed by the Bennett et al report 
(2014) for the LGA, which looks specifically at comparing three potential intervention 
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approaches (which they refer to as ‘self’, ‘sector’ or ‘centre’) to the turnaround of 
significantly underperforming councils and attempts to provide an ‘ideal model’ for 
the future. Our purpose is not to contradict the basic thrust of this and associated 
reports (on the contrary we support a substantial amount of it), but to respond 
positively to their initiative, and to build upon or refine some of their analysis, 
conclusions and recommendations, so as to help inform more economic, efficient 
and effective interventions in the future.  
 
Literature  
This paper builds on studies of corporate intervention, turnaround and recovery in 
local authorities, many of which focussed on the early years of CPA (Turner et al, 
2004; Boyne, 2004; Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Turner and Whiteman, 2005; Wilson 
and Moore, 2007). Writing later, Beeri (2009, 2012 2013b), Douglas et al, (2012), 
Jones, (2013) and Murphy et al (2014) take an ex-post, longitudinal view of the CPA 
era, triangulating corporate assessments with reflections from senior practitioners 
and regulators and allowing the themes emerging from previous studies to be 
developed. This information complements the substantial evidence presented to the 
select committee (House of Commons 2011) and the Audit Commission’s series of 
national reports (Audit Commission 2001, 2009). All, report favourably on the 
process and concluded with useful lessons that, in many cases, were adopted by 
both national and local government when developing the future generations of local 




Unsurprisingly there is less academic literature evaluating the current SLI regime 
because of its contemporary nature. Many of the studies that have been undertaken, 
have either been produced or commissioned by the LGA (Bennett et al 2014, Downe 
et al 2014a, Downe et al 2014b, LGA 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, Planning Advisory 
Service 2013, Shared Intelligence 2013, 2014,). However, the authors consider there 
is sufficient evidence emerging to begin to make comparisons and draw out some 
lessons for the future development of the intervention regime.  
 
Contextualising Corporate Intervention 
A high-level generic model, for designing and assessing the strategic, operational 
and financial performance regimes in locally delivered public sectors and services, 
has been identified from the current and previous performance management regimes 
for local government and other locally delivered public services in England. It builds 
upon, but extends, previous performance management regimes and frameworks, 
particularly CPA, CAA, and the more recent SLI regime, as well as individual service 
models. It also identifies the key areas for addressing corporate interventions. It is 
complemented by an assessment of the current state of maturity, and level of 
sophistication, of the ‘evidence base’ currently available for assessing corporate 
performance as assessed against the generic typology shown in Figure 1. This high-
level indicative typology was developed contemporaneously with CPA and was used 
to scope ‘fitness for purpose’ of contemporary and subsequent intervention regimes 
for locally delivered services from 2002 to 2009. It has also been used in subsequent 
academic papers (see Murphy and Greenhalgh 2013).  
Insert Fig 1 about here 
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The generic model differentiates four conceptual areas of interest or ‘domains’, 
which are shown in simple terms in figure 2 below but comprise:- 
 An assessment of strategic and operational performance of the organisation, 
 An assessment of the finances and resources and their assurance and 
resilience, 
 An assessment of the individual and collective performance of collaborations 
and partnerships the organisation is strategically involved in delivering, 
 An assessment of the organisation’s improvement and innovation and its 
contribution to systemic improvement in its services or sector.  
These domains all need to be addressed in any strategic turnaround or corporate 
intervention.  
Insert Fig 2 about here 
The remainder of this paper will consist of a brief summary of the lessons learned 
from the CPA interventions and the more recent SLI interventions, that are largely 
summarised by Bennett et al (2014), followed by a brief discussion and some 
conclusions and recommendations for further enhancing the regime. 
 
Local Authority Corporate Intervention under CPA 
In a recent study by one of the authors into the nature of strategic turnaround within 
English local authorities during the CPA Jones (2013), identified a number of 
underlying causes of corporate failure and subsequent recovery approaches adopted 
by improving local authorities, which can be used to help evaluate the usefulness of 
CPA as a mechanism for identifying and transforming poor performances.  Taking a 
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longitudinal view of 23 case study local authorities, across the whole of the CPA 
period the study undertook an in depth analysis of the archival record of corporate 
inspections and performance reports, as well as key informant interviews with senior 
officers within turnaround authorities and government lead officials (who played a 
key role in brokering improvement either through direct intervention or support), 
It is important to recognise that CPA did not occur in isolation and was in fact part of 
a package of scrutiny and performance regimes that had developed and evolved 
under the Labour government of the early 2000s.  Figure 3 below shows how CPA 
connected with other initiatives during this time and figure 4 demonstrates the level 
and extent of scrutiny extant during this time, of which CPA was one, albeit 
significant, element. 
Insert Fig 3 about here 
Insert Fig 4 about here 
It can be seen that external scrutiny during this time was a mix of statutory/non-
statutory and peer and professional assessment.  In truth, there was a lot of it and it 
is easy to see why CPA (and its replacement CAA) in particular, becoming a 
relatively easy political target as being over-bureaucratic and costly (House of 
Commons 2011). However, in the context of turnaround and improvement, CPA did 
provide a useful and necessary vehicle for identifying poorly performing councils, 
some of which were described by a ‘Lead Official’ leading the case study 
interventions (all of whom, at least in the early days, were senior ex-local authority 
officers) as ‘undeniably unacceptable to any of the three party political leaderships 
(Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic) of the LGA, the Audit Commission, 
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the former  Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) or the government’ 
(Jones 2013). 
The costs of the CPA Intervention model were also far lower than previous peer-
based initiatives from the former IDeA, in for example the London Borough of 
Lambeth, or the previous alternative of undertaking from the inspectorates of a 
series of service interventions such as the Education intervention in Leicester City; 
interventions that followed the issuing of Public Interest Reports by external auditors; 
or the high profile intervention in the London Borough of Hackney in 2000 (Campbell-
Smith 2008, Audit Commission 2002).    
Jones identified a range of underlying causes of poor performance present in failing 
councils at that time, namely;  
 Lack of corporate capacity and capability,  
 Lack of strategic leadership skills,  
 Denial of the problem,  
 Insularity and lack of self-awareness,  
 Abnormal factors, incidents and events,  
 Multiple and major service performance failings,  
 Poor stakeholder management,  
 Poor external collaboration,  
 Poor prioritisation,  




There is clearly some overlap and considerable similarity between these causes and 
the findings of other studies, (Bennett et al, 2014 at p8, provides a summary of 
these). However, of key concern to this paper is the finding that the problems 
associated with poor performance were exclusively internally driven and stemmed 
from poor leadership and governance in terms of failing to recognise that 
organisations were poorly performing in the first place (Jones, 2013).  Indeed, the 
problem was so inherent in poor councils that some even misread voluntary 
inspections and LGA arranged peer reviews prior to the first CPA inspections, 
considering themselves to be good and therefore taking no significant action to 
improve, when in fact they subsequently were assessed as poor or weak after formal 
inspections under CPA.   
This is not to say that all poorly performing councils were in denial or misread the 
well-intentioned signs. Indeed, at least two councils, Coventry and Bury, following 
initial peer assessment, took pre-emptive action a year in advance of the first CPA 
inspection to remove the incumbent Chief Executive, and in the former case the 
council leader.  However, this tended to be the exception rather than the rule and it 
was not usually until after a CPA corporate inspection that senior personnel changes 
(officer and elected representatives) occurred. 
Jones found that CPA itself was the key trigger event that prompted the process of 
turnaround, and without its visible and inescapable scrutiny and comparison, change 
would not have occurred, a point that was recognised by all of the local authority 
officials interviewed for that study.   This is not to say that those that underwent 
turnaround disliked CPA, and it is important to recognise that there were different 
levels of intervention in place ranging from the draconian to the supportive (ODPM 
2003a, 2003b, Beeri 2012).  The key question posed by lead officials during the 
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initial review of failing councils was if the council had the ‘will and the where-with-all’ 
to get itself out of trouble.  If it did, then the accompanying regime, which included 
peer assessment and peer support, was generally supportive and the lead officials 
left as soon as the council was on a demonstrably sustainable recovery trajectory.  
There was therefore a recognition of the need for “self-improvement” and the need 
for sustainable recovery under CPA, which is also a major finding of the recent 
studies into the previous and current performance frameworks from Bennett et 
al.(2014) Downe et al (2014) and others  
It is also clear that as CPA and related inspections built up an individual 
organisational and collective body of robust evidence, the issue of ‘denial’ gradually 
receded as coercive and mimetic isomorphism spread (Di Maggio and Powell 1991). 
In fact the range of improvements experienced under CPA (Bennett et al, 2014; 
Jones, 2013) included developing a better understanding of roles and relationships 
between officers and elected officials (especially in terms the inter-relationship 
between them), the introduction of new people and structures as well as strategic 
processes including the prioritisation of resources and performance management.  
They also included improvement in, so called ‘external facing’ approaches such as 
gathering intelligence and working with others.  Significantly, these changes 
collectively brought about an increase in self-awareness that became increasingly 
important in the sustainability of successful turnarounds. 
As assessed against the typology for the evidence base of performance 
management regimes shown in Figure 1 above, CPA was data rich, using 
information from a variety of sources and weighting this to form the overall 
assessment. It also increased the transparency and visibility of this information 
through the routine publication of inspection reports and assessments by the Audit 
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Commission. Similarly, a range of tools and techniques, were developed appropriate 
to the elements within the assessment in which they were used, e.g. external 
inspection reports from regulators, peer assessments and finance and audit 
inspections. The network of lead officials working with the Audit Commission and 
IDeA-commissioned peer assessors collectively provided a substantial co-ordinating 
framework aimed at ensuring consistency of approach and open, robust reporting.  
CPA also introduced for the first time the assessment of a range of strategic and 
corporate processes through ‘key lines of enquiry’ looking at collaborative working 
and engagement, leadership and governance arrangements and capacity as well as 
the way that internal and external scrutiny and challenge was undertaken and 
embedded.  Finally through an assessment of ambition and ‘direction of travel’ 
(progress) it also raised the profile of the need to be focussed on the real and not 
merely the perceived needs of a locality in its wider context. 
Jones (2013) and Beeri (2012) have shown that despite the centralist nature of CPA, 
it was not wholly top-down and unsupportive.  Indeed, the intervention process 
could, where appropriate, be a light touch affair. However, the strength of CPA was 
in its trigger capacity and this was largely due to the comprehensive nature of the 
evaluation, its collective and mutually supportive use of expert agencies to provide 
an evidence base, and the sanctions that went with it in terms of transparent and 
public reporting.   
The compulsory nature of CPA also ensured that poorly performing councils were 
identified and the reasons for this poor performance were articulated, ‘surfaced’ and 
addressed.  Given that a key finding of most of the earlier studies (Turner et al, 2004; 
Jas and Skelcher, 2005; Turner and Whiteman 2005), is that poor councils initially 
fail to recognise the need to engage with comparative exercises and do not perceive 
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themselves to be poor (something which changed in councils during CPA), 
demonstrates this was a key strength of CPA.  Clearly only a small minority of 
councils were failing and to some other councils CPA was considered an 
unnecessary burden but the question remains, without the external and independent 
scrutiny offered by CPA, would there have been an increasing scope for poor 
councils to slip through the net, only coming to light when it was too late?  This is 
especially poignant during the period of austerity when councils are embarking on 
radical and therefore relatively risky strategies of redesign and realignment. It also 
raises the issue of transparency and public assurance, which we will return to later in 
this paper. 
 
Local Authority Corporate Intervention under Sector Led Improvement 
As mentioned above, this part of the paper is heavily dependent on analysis of a 
number of recent reports sponsored by the LGA, and in particular, the studies by 
Downe et al (2014), which is an evaluation of the LGA’s Corporate Peer Challenge 
(CPC), and Bennett et al (2014), which is an appraisal of three alternative 
approaches to corporate turnaround, namely self-improvement, sector-led 
improvement and centre-led improvement. The study by Bennett et al (2014) is built 
upon a literature review of the CPA era and detailed case studies of the Doncaster 
and Wirral interventions since the general election of 2010. 
The current paper compares interventions under CPA with the corporate peer 
challenges under SLI. At this stage it is important to note two things, CPA and 
Central Government Intervention was developed and supported by the previous 
government under CPA, but at each stage of CPA (and its successor CAA) there 
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was greater involvement and support provided by the local government sector 
collectively i.e. they were progressively moving towards SLI. However, as the select 
committee reports show, (House of Commons 2011) after the general election of 
2010, both the new Coalition Government and the LGA, (which were by this time, 
both dominated by the Conservatives), clearly supported and embraced SLI.  
Secondly, in addition to other primary research, the LGA study had access to the first 
40 CPC reports and studies of the CPA literature (Bennett et al 2014), while our  
analysis only had access to the CPC reports that have been published on the LGA 
website (a minority of reports issued to date). Our analysis compares this material 
with a document analysis of 23 primary case study reports and material, previously 
in  the public domain, but no longer publically available following the abolition of the 
Audit Commission and the transfer of only part of its archive (and the capacity to 
interrogate that archive) to the National Archives. This was supplemented with 
interviews and participant observation from former lead officials (including one of the 
authors) who were responsible for 20 intervention cases. 
Bennett et al (2014) suggest that there are four broad stages that characterise 
successful turnaround, 
 Triggers that help overcome denial and accept the need to change which can 
come from challenge, persuasion, compulsion and /or threats, 
 Formulation of an effective recovery strategy, 
 Retrenchment and stabilisation and action, monitoring and capacity building, 
 An exit strategy when confidence is restored, performance management 
embedded and ownership or responsibility is resumed. 
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“But understanding what achieves turnaround in particular situations involves further 
lessons under 5 major headings” (Bennett et al 2014 p7), all of which were included 
in the study by Jones, (2013) and one of which is the focus for the current paper i.e. 
“Self, sector or centre which is the best approach and what are the conditions for 
success”. Bennett et al suggest that there is a clear value hierarchy to turnaround, if 
other things are equal (original author’s emphasis), namely self-improvement, sector-
led improvement and only, as a last resort, central government led intervention. The 
authors would agree with this value hierarchy, as would the overwhelming majority of 
people interviewed for our own studies (government officials, auditors and 
improvement professionals, managers and politicians involved in the case studies).  
Bennett et al (2014), later accept that both sector-led and centre-led approaches can 
effect turnaround and that there is no ‘one best way’ capable of achieving it. They do 
however conclude that “…..an approach that supports self-led turnaround and after 
that favours SLI, is more consistent with a ‘localist’ philosophy than one based on 
central government intervention. It also potentially brings practical benefits in terms 
of cost, disruption and sustainability” (2014 p 43). The localist philosophy (as a broad 
approach) is not however too dissimilar to the devolutionist aspirations of the 
previous labour government or the subsidiarity principle established in article 5 of the 
Treaty on European Union, which suggests that problems should be dealt with at the 
most immediate (or local) level consistent with their solution. The issue of whether it 
brings practical benefits in terms of costs is an issue we will return to later in this 
paper when we also consider some other perspectives such as transparency and 
public assurance.  
Bennett et al, (2014) having helpfully explored the optimisation of self and sector-led 
improvement also provide an ‘ideal model’ for the improvement landscape which 
17 
 
accepts that even under optimal conditions for self-improvement and SLI, the 
backstop of central government intervention is likely to need to remain.  
They therefore suggest the agreement of a protocol to be applied to those situations 
where there is sufficient evidence-based concern about the conduct or performance 
of a council. They do not acknowledge them, but equivalent protocols where rapidly 
developed and issued to lead officials (after consultation with the LGA and the Audit 
Commission) under CPA (ODPM 2003a, 2003b), while equivalent protocols for 
example in Fire and Rescue interventions have been produced as a result of Section 
24 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act during the CPA era, as well as a revised 
protocol in 2012 under SLI.  
Although the authors of the two reports (Bennet at al,2014, Downe et al 2014), are 
far more nuanced and sophisticated in their considerations and conclusions, the LGA 
in its final report on the evaluation of the SLI conclude  that:- 
 “an independent evaluation of SLI compared to central government intervention, for 
turning round a council that is visibly failing, concluded that a sector-led approach is 
better in supporting councils in their improvement journey, all else being equal” (LGA 
2014 p 5 current authors’ emphasis). 
 
Moving Forward: some conclusions and recommendations. 
The purpose of this paper was to appraise and compare the intervention and 
turnaround regimes that operated in local authorities under CPA with the current 
regime under SLI, in order to synthesize current knowledge on the subject and 
inform future policy and practice. The two regimes have therefore been examined to 
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compare and contrast their strengths, and to identify potential weakness in order to 
help develop policy and practice in the future. 
In so doing, it is useful to remember that although the intervening period was largely 
a transition period, there were undoubtedly valuable aspects, particularly from the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment and Total Place initiatives, that were recognised 
by both central government and local government and the deliverers of local public 
services in other sectors, as well as by those who represent them collectively, their 
professional institutions and their regulators (LGA 2010, Hayden et al 2010). These 
lessons however, tended to revolve around improvements in collaborative working 
and partnerships, the development of national and local data, and information and 
intelligence that led to improvements in the local and national evidence bases 
available to all parties, of which the development of Joint Strategic Needs 
Assessments was an obvious example. There was however less progress made in 
the areas that are the focus of this paper, namely the performance management 
regime for local government as a whole and the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
intervention regimes for poorly performing councils and other local service delivery 
bodies. 
We believe that our research for this paper, the earlier work by Jones (2013), and 
the work sponsored by the LGA, particularly the report from Bennett et al (2014), 
have far more upon which all parties and commentators can agree on than they 
would disagree. Bennett et al, suggest that critical to any strategy is:-  
….“the recognition of the factors and circumstances that are unique to each poorly 
performing local authority, and that the design of the intervention therefore accounts 
19 
 
for these features as contextual factors that need to influence and support 
intervention processes.” (2014 p10) and 
….“What is critical is an authoritative voice capable of formulating and implementing 
a credible strategy which properly understands why turnaround is needed, and how 
those problems can be connected with a well-resourced and effectively managed 
strategy of engagement” (2014 p11). 
This echo’s the New Labour government’s mantra of “what matters is what works” 
from the early days of corporate intervention under CPA. In the first rounds of 
intervention under CPA, all lead officials and chairs of Government Monitoring 
Boards were former Directors or CEO’s of local authorities, although towards the end 
senior civil servants, regional office officials, auditors and others, without that 
background and experience, were sometimes appointed. It also reflected the more 
subtle changes in the Audit Commissions approach to designing its frameworks. This 
drifted from a clear focus on facilitating rapid improvement in Local Authorities, to 
much more of a ‘compliance‘ based approach as auditors rather than inspectors 
reported to monitoring boards. A  ‘tick box’ and bureaucratic mentality also re-
emerged  in the middle to late years of CPA, after reductions to the Commission’s 
financial support from central government were included in the Comprehensive 
Spending Review of 2005 (Campbell-Smith 2008).    
The current research has however highlighted, inter alia, some key areas for 
improvement, some of which are confirmations of areas and issues highlighted in 
earlier literature, and some of which we believe are new. 
The operation of collecting, analysing and using information for this study has itself 
highlighted a significant deterioration in the national evidence base. The availability 
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and ease of accessing performance information; the adequacy of the tools and 
techniques for interrogating and quality assuring its content; and the reduction in the 
systematic support infrastructure for improvement and innovation built or reliant upon 
it  has all contributed to this deterioration (Ferry and Murphy 2015). This is largely as 
a result of the closure of the Audit Commission, the IDeA and related improvement 
agencies in Health, Police etc. and the reduction in budgets of those that survived. 
One particular key aspect for this study was the failure to keep the Audit 
Commission’s comprehensive organisational archive publically available and in one 
place, including its archive of individual authority reports and the incalculable 
corporate memory loss that went along with it.   
Research for this paper also highlighted the loss of a range of previously 
sophisticated tools and techniques to interrogate the evidence base. Neither the 
National Archives nor the LGA website are an adequate substitute for the previous 
inter-active Audit Commission and IDeA websites, and we are left to wonder why this 
invaluable archive wasn’t transferred, in total, to the National Audit Office. The NAO  
were clearly identified early in the process by the Secretary of State as the intended 
guardians for ensuring the future financial assurance and co-ordination of public 
audit. It would have been particularly useful for the Secretary of State’s proposed 
army of armchair auditors (DCLG, 2010b). 
A comparison of the current state of the evidence base for local authority 
performance against the developmental model outlined in figure 1, would show that 
the evidence available in 2010 (up to the announcement of the abolition of the Audit 
Commission), was undoubtedly improving and  equated to category 3, on the 
typology. However, rather than moving forward, and perhaps being fit for purpose at 
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some future point for a self-regulating regime, the evidence base has in fact 
deteriorated to, at best, a ‘data rich’ category 2 state. 
This points to the second area that this research has highlighted where ‘other things’ 
have not ‘remained equal’ for local government improvement, (whatever approach is 
adopted), namely the accountability and transparency of the information available for 
the financial assurance and the performance management of individual authorities 
and local government sector collectively (Ferry and Murphy 2015). The LGA’s final 
evaluation report  (LGA 2014), points to ‘stronger local accountability’ and supports 
this with subjective evidence from opinion polls; the self-interested views of senior 
members and officers about accountability in their own authorities, and the 
‘increased confidence among government departments and their inspectorates in the 
theory of SLI and local accountability since the LGA “baseline” interviews of 2012 – 
although it notes that  they wanted to see more evidence of it working in practice.  
This contrasts with our own evidence and experience. From an admittedly small 
sample of senior and middle managers from local authorities (circa 65), i.e. those 
who undertook the performance management modules in our postgraduate part time 
courses over the last five years. For their assignments, these students assess and 
compare two performance management regimes and not surprisingly, often look at 
CPA and SLI since they have personal experience of both. They are asked to look at 
the regimes from the perspective of the public interest rather than from the interest of 
central or local government. They generally considered that there was more merit in 
the previous regime than in the current regime seeing the latter as more partial, 
opaque, voluntary and far poorer in terms of quality assurance and, more especially, 
accountability transparency and public assurance. 
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Finally, all the evidence points to a need for an open, transparent, robust and 
independent appraisal of the costs and benefits of alternative forms of intervention, 
and the likelihood of sustainability of the different approaches in particular 
circumstances. Although the authors no longer have access to the assessments, 
they are aware (from personal involvement in one case), that such a high level 
appraisal of CPA costs where undertaken in 2001 when DETR were responsible for 
the local government sector.       
Bennett et al (2014 p16) state “it is important to note that a variety of commentators 
have concluded that central interventions can be relatively cost effective even taking 
into account the associated collateral and non-financial costs”. Ministers at the time 
of CPA found that the services that the public were having to endure (in some cases 
for some considerable time), and for which they had no choice about paying,  were 
so unacceptable, that expediting their improvement called at that time for a more 
radical and sometimes more coercive or directive approach. The alternative of 
extending the pre-existing local government peer improvement programme was not 
acceptable on economy, efficiency or effectiveness grounds and more radical action 
was considered necessary.   
More recently, the issues in Rochdale and Birmingham, suggest SLI may not be 
adequate in all individual cases, and the recent report from Transparency 
International (2013) on corruption in UK local government, suggests a more 
systematic response needs to be complemented by a more robust intervention 
model than the one currently in place.   
This paper has provided a contribution to the review of alternative intervention 
models and made suggestions as to when and where the different approaches 
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should be used. Our findings acknowledge that both CPA and SLI have merits and 
weaknesses depending on the context and policy priorities. However, the evidence 
base used by the latter was more partial not least because, there is a reduced level 
of public access to quality assured public data and information relating to local 
authority performance.  
This study highlights the need for a more comprehensive analysis and appraisal of 
both the CPA and SLI regimes than is currently available. Such an analysis would 
facilitate the development of a future regime that is more balanced, proportionate 
and cost effective, while providing efficacy across a range of circumstances, and in 




Audit Commission. (2001). Changing Gear. Best Value Annual Statement. London: 
Audit Commission. 
 
Audit Commission. (2002). Force for Change: Central Government Intervention in 
failing Local Government Services. London: Audit Commission.  
 




Audit Commission. (2008). Report in the Public Interest under Section 8 of the Audit 
Commission Act 1998 Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council. London: Audit 
Commission  
 
Audit Commission. (2009). Final Score: the impact of Comprehensive performance 
assessment of local government 2002-2008. London: Audit Commission. 
 
Beeri, I. (2009). ‘The Measurement of Turnaround Strategies in Local Authorities’, 
Public Money and Management 29, 2 pp 131-135 
 
Beeri, I. 2012. Turnaround Management Strategies in local authorities: not only for 
poor performers. Local Government Studies, 38 (4) pp 461-483. 
 
Beeri, I. 2013a. Direct administration of failing local authorities: democratic deficit or 
effective bureaucracy? Public Money and Management, Vol 33 (2) 137-144. 
 
Beeri, I. 2013b. Government Strategies towards poorly-performing municipalities: 
from narrow perceptions to ineffective policies. Lex-Localis – Journal of Local Self 
Government Vol 11 (1) pp 33-52. 
 
Bennett, Allen, T Grace, C and Martin, S. (2014). Self, sector or centre? Approaches 




Boyne. G. (2004). ‘A 3Rs Strategy for Public Service Turnaround: Retrenchment, 
Repositioning and Reorganisation’, Public Money and Management 24, 2 pp 97-103 
 
Brown L. (2014). The future of Fire and Rescue Services in England – a survey for 
Shadow Minister Lyn Brown MP. London: House of Commons.  
 
Campbell-Smith, D. (2008). Follow the Money: The Audit Commission Public Money 
and the Management of Public Services1983-2008. London: Audit Commission. 
 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants. (2015.) Protecting the public 
purse: The future of public audit. Cipfa/PF Perspectives London: CIPFA.  
 
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1991). Introduction – The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Douglas D. Jenkins, W. and Kennedy, J. (2012). ‘Understanding Continuous 
Improvement in an English Local Authority’, International Journal of Public Sector 




Downe, J. Martin, S. and Doring, H. (2014). Supporting councils to succeed. 
Independent evaluation of LGA’s corporate peer challenge programme. London: 
LGA.  
 
Department of Communities and Local Government. (2010a). Eric Pickles to disband 
Audit Commission in new era of town hall transparency. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eric-pickles-to-disband-audit-commission-in-
new-era-of-town-hall-transparency accessed 15/12/2015. 
 
Department of Communities and Local Government. (2010b). Eric Pickles 'shows us 





Ferry L. and Murphy, P. (2015). A Comparative review of Financial Sustainability, 
Accountability and Transparency of Local Public Service Bodies in England under 
Austerity. Report to the National Audit Office.  
 
Hayden, C., Jenkins, l., Rickey, B., Martin, S., Downe, J., Chan, D,L., McLarty, 





House of Commons. (2011). Select Committee: Audit and inspection of local 
authorities - Communities and Local Government Committee 4th Report Norwich: 
TSO. 
 
Local Government Association. (2010). CAA evaluation: a sector perspective on 
year 1. London Local Government Association  
 
Local Government Association. (2011).Taking the lead: self-regulation and 
improvement in local government London: LGA. 
 
Local Government Association. (2012a). Research report: National Foundation for 
Educational research 2012 Evaluation of early adopter sector-led improvement 
programme pilots London: LGA. 
 
Local Government Association. (2012b). Research report: National Foundation for 
Educational research 2013 Evaluation of the sector-led peer challenge programme 
London: LGA. 
 
Local Government Association. (2014). Evaluation of sector–led improvement 




Local Government Association. (2015.) Taking stock: Where next with sector-led 
improvement? London LGA. 
 
Lowndes, V and Pratchett, L. (2012). Local governance under the Coalition 
Government austerity, localism and the big society. Local government Studies Vol 
38 (1), pp21-40. 
 
Jas, P and Sketcher, C. (2005). ‘Performance Failure and Turnaround in Public 
Sector Organisations’. British Journal of Management, 16,3 pp 195-210 
 
Jones, M. (2013). Corporate Recovery and Strategic Turnaround in English Local 
Government. DBA. Nottingham Trent University. 
 
Martin, J., 2008. Inspection of education and skills: from improvement to 
accountability. In Davis, H., and Martin, S., Public Services Inspection in the UK 
London: Jessica Kindersley. 
 
Murphy, P. 2014 The development of the strategic state and the performance 
management of local authorities in England. In: P. JOYCE and A. DRUMAUX, eds., 
Strategic management in public organizations: European practices and 




Murphy, P. and Greenhalgh, K. (2013). Performance management in fire and rescue 
services. Public Money & Management, 33 (3), pp. 225-232 
 
Murphy, P. and Greenhalgh, K. (2014). Peer challenge needs an independent Fire 
Inspectorate. FIRE, 106 (July/August), pp. 17-19 
 
Murphy, P, and Greenhalgh, K. (2015). A response to ‘The future of Fire and Rescue 
Services in England available from the Fire Sector Federation and Nottingham Trent 
University 
 
Murphy, P. Greenhalgh, K. and Jones, M. (2011). Comprehensive performance 
assessment and public services improvement in England? A case study of the 
benefits administration service in local government. Local Government Studies, 37 
(6), pp. 579-599. 
 
Murphy, P. Greenhalgh, K. and Jones, M. (2014). Housing and council tax benefits 
administration in England: a long-term perspective on the performance of the local 
government delivery system. Local Government Studies, 40 (5), pp. 729-744 
 
National Audit Office. (2013a). Financial Sustainability of local authorities – Report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General Norwich: TSO and London Houses of 




National Audit Office. (2013b).Financial management in government – Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General TSO and London: Houses of Parliament Shop. 
 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2003a). Government Engagement with Poorly 
Performing Councils: Practice guidance for Lead Officials London ODPM. 
 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. (2003b). Government Engagement with Poorly 
Performing Councils: Practice guidance for Lead Officials 2nd edition London ODPM. 
 
Planning Advisory Service. (2013). Impact evaluation assessment – 2012/13 end of 
year report. London: LGA. 
 
Rutherford, A. 2014 Organizational Turnaround and educational performance: the 
impact of performance-based monitoring analysis systems. American Review of 
Public Administration Vol 44 (4) pp 440-458. 
 
Shared Intelligence. (2013). Change gear! Learning from health and wellbeing pilots 
peer challenges. LGA London. 
 





Timmins, N, and Gash, T. (2014). Dying to Improve: The demise of the Audit 
Commission and Other Improvement Agencies. London: Institute for Government. 
 
Transparency International. (2013). Corruption in UK Local Government: The 
mounting risks. Transparency International UK London: available at 
www.transparency.org.uk accessed 2nd April 2015. 
 
Turner D and Whiteman P. (2005). ‘Learning From the Experience of Recovery: The 
Turnaround of Poorly Performing Local Authorities’, Local Government Studies, 31, 
5 pp 627-654. 
 
Turner, D. Skelcher, C. Whiteman, P. Hughes, M. and Jas. P. (2004). ‘Intervention 
or Persuasion? Strategies for Turnaround of Poorly-Performing Councils’.  Public 
Money and Management 24, 4 pp 217. 
 
Wilson J and Moore C. (2007). ‘Leading and Measuring Improvement in Local 
Government: The Case of Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council’, Public 
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